The West may be more polarised than ever, in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election, but it’s far from unique in this respect. Global fault lines are hardening between the Eurasian sphere of influence, led by China and Russia, and the Euro-Atlantic alliance of the United States and NATO. 

Large swathes of the Global South are choosing teams and lining up more strictly with the military and economic interests of their respective patron power blocs. But not every nation wants to pick a side. In fact, a growing number have more leverage precisely as a result of playing the East and West off against each other instead of sticking to one lane. 

Indeed, there remain a number of large economic middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey and Saudi Arabia who play all sides whenever possible. They prefer to cosy up to the interests of both the East and West depending on the specific situation. Various smaller nations are also choosing a path of keeping their options open, juggling phone calls from Beijing and Washington with equal ambivalence. 

As the Economist points out, “China has a genius for spotting countries unhappy with the international status quo, and looking for an alternative … When Western powers neglect countries that boast a strategic location, China takes note.”

What will become of these non-aligned nations? Will they come to adopt a firmly pro-China and Russia or pro-NATO stance in search of consistent security and prosperity, or will they continue to play both sides? In short: can much of the Global South keep hedging its bets? 

First, there’s China’s advantage: a Global South that’s resentful of Western trade practices and its own lack of large-scale advancement. As Michael Schuman observes, many developing nations “are frustrated with their countries’ slow pace of development and lack of influence within the US-led global system, and they are looking for alternative sources of finance, assistance, and support to advance their desire for greater wealth and influence.”

China has strategically intervened with piles of investment and an emphasis on bilateral cooperation, forums and lending a constant ear to the struggles and debt crises of the developing world. Beijing has presented itself as the answer to countries seeking a reliable patron state to rely on. 

“These small countries are not stupid,” stated Chinese former army colonel Zhou Bo of Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy. “They just want to make a balance, too, because China’s strength is growing.”

While generally negative public sentiment prevails towards China in much of the EU and Western world, a growing number of countries including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are much more positive about China and its influence on the world stage. 

As China and the United States project force, hone technology, and exert economic power there are different theories of full spectrum dominance at play. Looking at historical precedent, we can see a pattern emerge. From the Great Game to the Cold War, victory has meant different things to different powers. Reagan’s “peace through strength” in the Cold War, for example, maintained “containment” and surpassing of the Soviet Union as the mark of victory, gaining validation through the collapse of the USSR.  

In today’s climate, US dominance centres on the target of maintaining economic and military dominance while hampering Chinese efforts to gain serious economic or geopolitical footholds that could seriously threaten the US-led world order. From AI to supply chain reformation and tariffs, Washington and NATO are trying to stop the rise of China and clamp down on its growing dominance in the Indo-Pacific. 

What could victory mean for China? Chinese leader Xi appears to be motivated by the tianxia guan Weltanschauung, seeing China as the centre of civilisation, spreading economic order and culture worldwide. Beijing believes in an indirect strategy of drawing nations into their orbit through increased trade, foreign infrastructure investment and oblique military cooperation. This includes projects like “Made in China 2025” and a focus on developing self-sufficient 5G networks, along with boosting Chinese diplomatic power via Xi’s GDI and Global Security Initiative (GSI) and economic power worldwide through the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), which pumps huge sums of foreign direct investment into developing nations worldwide. 

“China has worked to entice countries that are less invested in the U.S.-led international order to take its side and help fight its battles in the international community. This includes nations that openly resent the U.S. and oppose its leadership, such as Iran and Russia,” explains Michael Cunningham.

In the military sphere, China is focused on area denial and building up its navy and land forces to counteract Western influence, especially in the South China Sea. China seeks to break down the US-led order and replace it with a multipolar world where it has more ability to operate, profit and control client states without any effective Western response. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was also a net positive for China as it puts more pressure on the West and allows China to scoop up cheap Russian oil and gas, including paying for large amounts of it in yuan.

While the West is proving somewhat effective at stymying China’s technological and military ascendance, Western influence is being slowly chipped away in many parts of the developing world which are more hesitant to ally firmly with the US-led order. The likely response will be for Washington and Beijing to continue ramping up pressure on middle powers who, in turn, are likely to increasingly seek alliances among themselves. 

China is especially focused on the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Central Asia and South Asia, where it hopes to increase bilateral ties, foster dependence and undermine Western power. China is also gaining a sizeable foothold in Central and South America.

But China hasn’t won yet by a long shot. 

Michael Schuman argues that China “won’t win the Global South” because China’s main sales pitch that they are more humane and rational than the Western powers is falling flat. The Chinese presentation of themselves as a fellow victim of colonial imperialism and Western arrogance may make for catchy rhetoric of poorer nations rising up against their rich oppressors, but when the rubber hits the road there are numerous impediments to China’s strategy. The most obvious is that China is powerful, and presenting itself as just another beleaguered nation with the world’s poor is increasingly ineffective, especially when China is exploiting vast amounts of the natural resources of its supposed partner states. 

China is the boss and the banker, not the peer nation that its propaganda asserts

Remarks by Chinese VP Han Zheng that China “breathes the same breath with other developing countries and shares the same future with them,” ring increasingly hollow as the reality of its patron state status asserts itself against this supposed solidarity.

China is the boss and the banker, not the peer nation that its propaganda asserts. “At least we’re not the World Bank and the IMF” only goes so far when you become another version of the World Bank and the IMF. China’s response to the debt crisis faced by many developing nations has been lacklustre at best, with nations like Zambia complaining that China’s approach “makes our situation worse.” 

Various other small nations have also located themselves firmly in the Western Camp including Papua New Guinea and several Pacific Island nations put off by China’s interactions with them. The Philippines under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has also taken a U-turn firmly back into the US orbit after strong disagreements with China over fishing rights. 

One of China’s strongest rivals to lead the developing world is India, which posits itself as the democratic alternative to China and a more effective arbiter of the concerns and interests of the Global South. While geography and proximity will play a significant role in who is chosen by developing countries to put their lot behind, and resource-rich nations situated in strategically enviable positions will continue to get away with playing various sides off against each other. Beijing’s attempt to form a coherent Chinese-led order faces many stumbling blocks and if the United States turns further from alliances and deprioritises international trade, the EU does have the opportunity to pick up a lot of the slack. 

… it’s not so much that Eastern power is rising as it is that Western power is waning

Thus we return to the original question: will the developing world pick a side? Much of it is already choosing China, but it’s often choosing by default rather than real enthusiasm. Non-aligned nations, meanwhile, are still open to increased Western influence and alignment if, and when, they are presented with a stronger case and more consistent engagement. 

As Martin Sandbu notes, “developing countries are trading more with the rich world than they ever have, but they have also added a huge amount of trade with China and each other.”

Indeed, it’s not so much that Eastern power is rising as it is that Western power is waning. But the good news for the West is that this choice is decidedly unenthusiastic — depending far more on where the West falls short than on where China succeeds. This presents an opportunity for America and the EU to re-engage neutral nations who have fallen into China’s orbit by default rather than by real ideological affinity or long-term commitment. Chinese influence, in many places, could prove to be as fragile as the pottery with which the nation shared a name.