In January, the DUP struck a deal with Rishi Sunak’s government that it said removed the Irish Sea border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ending checks on goods and stopping an “automatic pipeline” of EU law. Based on Safeguarding the Union, the party restored power-sharing at Stormont, having previously boycotted devolution in protest against the Windsor Framework.

How has that strategy worked out for the DUP? 

Well, last week, the NI Assembly voted to endorse the framework for four more years, ignoring the objections of every unionist MLA. In Northern Ireland, controversial motions are supposed to pass only with cross-community consent, meaning unionists or nationalists can exercise a veto. This important principle was set aside specifically to ensure that the sea border remained in place.

Boris Johnson’s Conservative government agreed to this one off “democratic consent mechanism” when it negotiated the Northern Ireland Protocol. The decision to fiddle Stormont’s rules survived Rishi Sunak’s framework, which was supposed to reassure unionists that progress was being made on dismantling trade barriers. And Safeguarding the Union, which persuaded the DUP to return to the Assembly, contained only cosmetic changes to the mechanism.

Despite all the party’s negotiations, the vote last week was effectively predetermined in favour of unionism’s opponents.

That would matter less if the sea border really had disappeared, as the DUP claimed, or even if it was softer. In fact, the opposite is true. Last Friday, new EU product safety laws came into force in Northern Ireland, because the province is bound by single market rules on goods.

This regime is likely to decimate online sales between Great Britain and the province. The General Product Safety Regulations (GPSR) require companies to provide a swathe of extra information when they sell to the EU or Northern Ireland. In addition, they must nominate a “responsible person” on the ground, if they want to “export” goods to the province.  

Many businesses have already decided to pull out of Northern Ireland altogether, because they cannot justify the added costs and paperwork. The requirements are particularly unsustainable for small third-party traders on websites like Amazon or eBay, so customers are likely to find items become unavailable online. The e-shopping platform, Etsy, was the latest to confirm that it will make it easier for sellers to stop selling goods to Northern Ireland. In effect, the province will no longer be treated as part of the UK by online marketplaces.

The supply of goods to NI was already threatened by an impending parcels border that has been postponed until March, thanks only to strenuous lobbying from the logistics sector. When those arrangements come into place, products must be sent to Northern Ireland through the “red lane”, which entails full customs formalities, or the UK Internal Market Scheme (UKIMS).

In a later deal, the DUP capitulated to republicans’ demands on the Irish language

This route, known previously as the “green lane”, requires GB businesses to register as trusted traders and sign a range of guarantees that goods will not end up in the single market. Like many aspects of the sea border, the implications of getting this wrong are not yet clear, but companies are likely to be penalised or even thrown out of UKIMS.

For smaller traders in particular, the easiest decision is not to sell to Northern Ireland at all.

In Safeguarding the Union, the government claimed that the Windsor Framework, and EU law in Northern Ireland, applied only to the single market for goods. That has long since been disproved, as courts struck down the Immigration Act and parts of the Legacy Act in the province, on the basis that they were incompatible with Brussels’ human rights edicts. 

In fact, huge swathes of life in Northern Ireland remain under the authority of the EU. Elected representatives at Westminster and Stormont cannot legislate in those areas, if their proposed laws contradict EU determinations. 

The DUP no longer claims to have removed the Irish Sea border, and it has pledged to fight against EU laws that previously it said it had stopped. On the other hand, it still insists that it made “progress” toward ending trade barriers. Likewise, it claims that the Labour government must implement Safeguarding the Union in full, even though some elements, like the parcels border, could make Northern Ireland’s predicament worse.

The DUP traditionally depicted itself as a party of tough and uncompromising negotiators. That self-image was adopted widely in Great Britain, particularly when Arlene Foster claimed to have extracted £1.5 billion from Theresa May, in return for supporting the Conservatives at Westminster. In fact, whilst the DUP may have successfully wheedled money from the Treasury, it repeatedly struck deals that left unionism in a weaker position.

At St Andrews, in 2006, for example, it agreed to share power with Sinn Fein at Stormont, having previously criticised the Ulster Unionists for similar policies. As part of that agreement, the method of choosing a first minister in Northern Ireland was changed. The leader of the biggest party, rather than a leader from the largest designation (unionist or nationalist) would subsequently take the role. That is why the province is today led symbolically by a figure from Sinn Fein, a party linked inextricably to terror, rather than a unionist politician.

In a later deal, the DUP capitulated to republicans’ demands on the Irish language, citing as its counter-achievement the creation of a new commissioner for the “Ulster British Tradition”, which nobody seems to want or need. 

During the Brexit process, the party endorsed Theresa May’s “joint declaration” in December 2017, which entrenched the principle that Northern Ireland must align with EU rules. Then it accepted Boris Johnson’s suggestion of a regulatory border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, so long as there were no customs checks. That established the principle that the province’s trade laws could diverge from the rest of the United Kingdom.

To continue this pattern, after the protocol was inflicted on Northern Ireland, the DUP’s interventions only seemed to make things worse. From an unworkable arrangement that was largely unimplemented, thanks to grace periods and other derogations, the party’s discussions with the government delivered permanent barriers that could be maintained into the future.    

This legacy from the negotiators at the DUP cannot be seen as an aberration. They are masters at giving the impression of toughness, managing to secure headline sums of money for Northern Ireland (which may or may not materialise). Often, though, in the longer-term they turn out to have been thoroughly outfoxed on the most important issues.