Was the Maginot line really such a failure?

The Maginot line brings together two totemic forms. The first, that of the wall, is headed by the Great Wall of China and has distinguished entries from Antiquity, notably Hadrian’s Wall, but also subsequently. The Maginot Wall was the most notable twentieth-century instance before all things mural had their imagery rejigged by the American-Mexican border.

The other form of totemism is that of military failure and, more particularly, interwar failure. This is failure in perception, capability and results, and the Maginot Line vies with the guns at Singapore and the cult of the battleship as prime instances of an alleged failure to confront reality and thereby to block the rise and initial successes of the Axis powers.

In his excellent new book, Kevin Passmore confronts both his specific topic and more general approaches, and does so with skill, aplomb and consequence. This is a fully-researched study, one that draws heavily on a wide range of relevant French sources. There is room in future work for due engagement with German Intelligence, and Montgomery-Massingberg, the former British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had an instructive visit to the Maginot Line of which the record survives in his papers in the Liddell Hart archive. Nevertheless, Passmore has done everything, and more, to offer the fullest available account. He divides the book into four sections: Building the Maginot Line; Manning the Maginot Line; The Maginot Line in Civilian Society and Culture; and The Maginot Line in Combat. Each part, in turn, is divided into chapters, and the whole provides an extraordinarily important unravelling not only of the facts of the case but also of image, impression and myth. Readers will have their own particular interests and, if I perforce focus on mine, that is not to imply that the others are anything other than well-posed and ably handled.

The Line was not, Passmore shows, in the wrong place or considered invulnerable

In the first part, there is an adroit discussion of the inherent politicisation of military choice, politicisation both in terms of military factionalism and of civilian actors. Choice is a matter of tasking, strategy, doctrine, financing and timing, and of how these might change through time and with regard to circumstances, domestic and international, as well as in response to technological, organisational and other relevant or potentially relevant developments. From this perspective, Passmore has produced an exemplary study, one that is a model for others who are interested in the approach. There are of course comparable discussions, for example with reference to French infantry and fortification doctrines in the eighteenth century, and also to the Dreadnought “revolution”, as well as debates that more generally lack this amplitude, notably those addressing most supposed military revolutions, but Passmore provides the best available approach. His cast is fascinating, not least because so many played a role in the French part of World War Two.

After that, part two, is briefer, and, while incisive on the problems of discipline, only takes us so far. The third part includes an interesting discussion of the Line and Appeasement, as well as a more general consideration of nationalism in the borderlands. Part four, “the Maginot Line in Combat”, explains how strategy and fortification met the pressure of German attack. The defence was far better than generally believed.

In the conclusion, Passmore explains that the Vichy leaders never attributed the defeat to the Maginot line, whereas the Gaullists emphasised their leader’s favour for mobility and linked the Line to defeatism. Under the Fifth Republic, the Line was presented as a symbol of the failure of parliamentary government, whereas presidentialism was presented in terms of mobility and attacking. The Line was not, Passmore shows, “in the wrong place” or considered invulnerable, but he does suggest that, although modern, it was overmanned. This is linked to a potent interest lobby within the army linked to fortifications, and Passmore also relates French strategy to the struggle between generals. A brilliant study.