An intervention on interventionism

The last year of President Trump’s rule has been condemned by many on the right as a betrayal of the isolationist MAGA base and the victory of neo-conservatives. Despite Trump’s self-proclaimed dislike for wars, he launched two major military operations in Iran and Venezuela. By this point, it is abundantly clear that the former has been a humiliating disaster, resulting in a draft peace agreement that only further embarrasses POTUS. The latter, for now, appears to have been a success. The difference in approach and framing of the two operations represents an inflection point for neo-conservatism.

Whilst “neo-con” does get thrown around carelessly by many on the left and the right, it is not a completely useless category. Much like communists, liberals, fascists, and socialists, real neo-conservatives do indeed exist. Current US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Senator Lindsey Graham are two of the most outspoken representatives of the breed. 

However, these two hawks have confronted the rise of the isolationist MAGA movement in very different ways. Rubio has managed to penetrate Trump’s inner circles by toning down his rhetoric and focusing his efforts on the Western hemisphere, an area traditionally seen as Washington’s backyard. Graham, on the other hand, stuck to his unwavering and somewhat tone-deaf calls for “regime change” in Iran.

This, of course, is not surprising. Like most schools of thought, neo-conservatism has divergent strands and has evolved over time. Shortly before the capture of former President Nicolás Maduro, I wrote elsewhere on the lessons that early neo-conservatives, and Ronald Reagan’s Ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick in particular, hold for the current administration. In her famous essay “Dictatorship and Double Standards”, Kirkpatrick warned against utopian demands for democratisation and called for pragmatic engagement with all regimes based on the pursuit of national interest. However, post 9/11, neo-conservatives have embraced idealistic but ultimately disastrous attempts to “spread freedom and democracy” to the Middle East.

Now, of course, differences between Iran and Venezuela operations were not the result of the two kinds of “neo-cons” battling for power inside the White House. Clearly, in both cases Trump personally decided, or was convinced to, begin the operations, with little awareness of any foreign policy -isms, including neo-conservatism. Nevertheless, the manner in which the interventions were carried out is reminiscent of the difference between the early pragmatic Reagan neo-conservatism and the later utopian and reckless approach of the Bush era.

One achieved American objectives without attempting to remake the country, while the other was a reckless blunder made with hopes that the regime would either be overthrown by the Iranian people, who had been slaughtered in their thousands a month prior, or simply surrender. What is more, Trump explicitly stated that he was hoping to repeat the “Venezuela scenario”, in Iran, despite the vastly different history, regime structure and most importantly different tactics used by the US. 

The Venezuelan operation was a surgical strike followed by sober-minded negotiations with the regime. The results could hardly have been better for the White House: the new President Delcy Rodríguez, who was supposedly party to the deal all along, is openly co-operating with the USA by allowing it to control Venezuelan oil exports. Washington has leveraged this to impose an oil blockade on Cuba, possibly setting the stage for the next regional operation. In exchange, Rodríguez was allowed to appoint her loyalists to key positions and avoid calling an election, as long as she remained on good terms with Washington. 

The approach and outcomes of the Iranian campaign could hardly be more dissimilar. Whilst it would be silly to claim that Trump’s Iran gamble was motivated by a liberal desire to spread democracy, he clearly was hoping to galvanise the anti-government protests that took place in Iran a few months earlier. After killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, he wanted to pick the new Supreme Leader and replicate the success of the Venezuelan operation. 

With that strategy clearly having failed, Trump has hopefully learned — although I would not bet on it — that the world is more complex than it may seem and that different states and regions require different approaches. Indeed, some countries may welcome the removal of their leader. As a general rule, however, regime change operations instead trigger a “rally around the flag effect” and entrenched opposition even to the mightiest of armies. 

The crux of this lesson is that the “good” neo-conservative policy plays the hand that history deals it, and if the cards are not good enough, they should wait for the next hand before raising the stakes. One has to consider what will be the most effective way to deal with each specific regime, rather than attempt to destroy and remake it through hard power alone. Indeed, before the Iran operation, the Iranian theocracy had just put down the biggest protests in its history. Now the IRGC hardliners have been emboldened, the US has singlehandedly inflicted an energy price shock on its allies, and gave Iran an excuse to shut the Strait of Hormuz whenever it sees fit. 

Is this the outcome that Senator Graham has been hoping for the last decades? Evidently not, but the realisation of his maximalist goals would require a ground invasion that would sacrifice countless Americans on the altar of utopian state-building. All such neo-conservatives have to realise that there is neither the domestic appetite for such wars nor can the US afford to squander its military and economic resources to “fix” other countries. 

If neo-conservatism is to survive, it would do well to follow Rubio’s example rather than Graham’s. Any intervention must be precisely calibrated and willing to work through imperfect local actors — those who are not Washington’s natural allies, let alone its loyal friends. The only question is whether its hawks accept that before or after the next disaster.