The US should do more to advocate for peace

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, many commentators are focused on the potential for deal-making. First, with the latest ceasefire agreement in Gaza and second, with Trump’s claims to be able to bring about an end to hostilities and fighting in Ukraine. However, with the US being a secondary actor in both conflicts, not physically participating directly in fighting on the ground, why should a change of leadership in the United States serve as a focal point for a potential deal in either conflict?

With the ceasefire in Gaza coming just days before the inauguration, it seems that the transition of power in the U.S. is turning out to be a key force in breaking the bargaining stalemate, implying the potential for the same to be the case in Ukraine. However, simply coming to power is not enough for the incoming U.S. administration to end the wars, as a negotiation process is complex, with multiple factors driving actors and outcomes.

In his book How Wars End, Dan Reiter, professor of political science at Emory University, introduces a two-pronged framework in bargaining processes for conflict termination. The first prong involves information — the states will attempt bargaining to end conflicts after fighting has revealed the information that was unknowable or private at the beginning of the conflict, including the relative balance of power, the fighting resolve on either side, and the potential actions of third parties. Reiter then argues that while this prong is important to the deal-making process, it is not enough on its own to ensure that bargaining is even attempted, let alone concluded. In the case of Ukraine, much of this information was known as early as March 2022, and yet the fighting has continued for three years.

All the information in the world cannot alone begin or complete a deal-making process if either side cannot be convinced that the other will respect and follow any deal that is struck. Reiter argues that a second prong, overcoming a commitment problem, is a necessary factor in ending a conflict. To conclude a deal when there is a lack of trust, both sides must be willing to accept conditions in the agreement that make commitment mutually possible. Both Russia and Ukraine are deeply suspicious of one another, and Russia’s mistrust in the West further agitates the bargaining process here.

Given Reiter’s understanding of deal making, it can be argued that the Biden administration’s repeated rhetoric committing to Ukraine’s eventual ascension to NATO membership has played a role in the continuation of the war, as such assertions undermine any opportunity for the two warring sides to build trust and overcome the commitment problem preventing a peace deal. 

A potential change in U.S. policy under a new administration has the potential to influence negotiation along both prongs. In terms of information, the extent to which the new administration does or does not pursue additional aid to Ukraine influences the information that both sides have about the ability of Ukraine to continue fighting, which will influence their calculus about negotiations. But even more importantly, the policies of the United States as a third-party actor can influence the extent to which negotiations can overcome the commitment problem. To successfully negotiate a deal, both sides need some assurances that the other will respect the terms of the deal after it’s made, and some of the key assurances seem to involve US participation.

In a 2024 article for the Atlantic Council, Reiter himself outlines this dilemma between the two actors, as well as the additional trust issues stemming from the involvement of the United States and NATO countries as third-party actors in the conflict. He goes on to recommend potential conditions that could be negotiated into a settlement that would offer both sides some level of assurance in their future security. The compromises that Reiter suggests look something like armed neutrality for Ukraine — with Russia’s assurance being a concession from Ukraine and the West that Ukraine will not receive NATO membership, or any other formal security guarantee, and Ukraine’s assurance being that the West would offer the military and economic aid necessary to ensure that Ukraine is sufficiently powerful enough on its own to deter future Russian attacks. 

 Reaching a settlement will require the acceptance of concessions from both Ukraine and Russia

If the Trump administration wants to have a hand in breaking the current stalemate and bringing about negotiations, it will need to offer a different U.S. policy, potentially sponsoring a sort of armed neutrality situation for Ukraine, as Reiter himself suggests. Trump’s special envoy for the Russia-Ukraine war, Keith Kellogg, has outlined a plan that looks similar to Reiter’s suggestions, but key differences could undermine the necessary trust needed. Kellogg does break from Biden’s policy in putting a hold on Ukrainian NATO membership, thus offering some assurance to Russia. He also offers continuing military support to Ukraine in exchange for their participation in talks, a necessary component to reassure Ukraine. Thus far, the Kellogg plan offers only enough information and assurances to potentially bring Ukraine and Russia to the negotiation table. 

Reaching a settlement will require the acceptance of concessions from both Ukraine and Russia. A U.S. policy that advocates for armed neutrality and accepts the necessary concessions will encourage the war-weary primary belligerents to do the same. Post-war security will require both to commit to some sacrifice to build trust in a bargaining process — any resulting deal will certainly have its critics and feel politically like a lose-lose situation. Yet, three years of war have exacted steep costs on both sides, so a reliable end to the conflict is inevitably also a win-win.