Time for change?

The present always ambushes books on “the present”, for the latter dates, literally, while analyses change as new data has to be explained or interpretations rush through in the excitement of politics. Thus, in May 2026 there is much talk of how Trump’s poorly-prepared hyperbolic war with Iran has fractured the MAGA coalition, much of which was/is opposed to “forever wars”. There is also discussion of establishment Republican anger with the purging of the party actively encouraged by Trump. In short — a sense of too much and of electoral fatigue.

This approach can be regarded as not so much offering caveats, but rather contradiction, to the Goidels’ account of Trump’s usage of politics in order to establish himself by reconfiguring the Republican Party. In so doing, the emphasis is on his instinctive feel for tensions about economic and cultural developments:

The estrangement of non-college whites from the Democrats has been a long social process. As educational and cultural divides widen, white working-class identity increasingly intertwines with Republican messaging. Many working-class whites view the Democratic Party as dominated by affluent liberals who scold them on social issues and export their jobs through globalisation.

Rather than berating the working-class for “false consciousness”, the Goidels focus on the accurate perception offered by Trump and the inability of the previous Republican establishment to answer the popular anchor. As such, they emerge as problem and bar, albeit differently to the Democrats, but the Goidels handle their topic well and bring out its broader relevance for America.

The global applicability of the Goidel model is apparent, but, in practice, the political economy of distinctive party systems looks in particular ways and, as that of America is unusual, so also with the Trump approach. In America, the entry cost for a new national political party is very high which ensures a continued reliance on the Democrats and the Republicans. To take over, it is necessary to grasp, transform and use one of these; and that requires preserving labels and identity while totally changing purpose and content. Trump did so — rather as if he was a businessman gaining political real estate at the knockdown price made possible by Democrat successes in the elections of 2008 and 2012. Furthermore, the cost of a party takeover was low and this cost could essentially be pushed onto others. So also in the case of the impact; as with extensive gerrymandering.

Yet, the situation is generally more complex because, in most democracies, the entry cost for a new political movement is lower, and this is particularly so if it thrives on dissatisfaction and employs the cheap access of social media for exposition and canvassing.

It is no accident that most European countries have had new political parties over the last two decades, whereas America has not. That does not prevent the use elsewhere of Trump’s methods, but it provides a different context — one in which the new party might offer more short/medium term continuity than an individual dominating the Democrats or the Republicans. America as an elected monarchy puts the emphasis on the President which, given the nature of “time for a change” adversarial politics, can be inherently destabilising. In contrast, the Head of State/CEO split of so many states helps ensure that they can have more of a balanced political system than in the case of America.

For Britain, there appears particular relevance due to the declining ability of both Conservatives and Labour to attract their past numerical votes, let alone electoral percentages, and the linked challenges from new parties. For the Right, the Trump strategy of taking over the existing party, the Conservatives, or, at the least, moving it rightwards, has been followed fitfully. More weight in the Goidels’ terms of the social weight discussed in this book has come from successive iterations — UKIP, Brexit, Reform and Restore. It is unclear how far they can succeed if at least a sixth of the voting electorate and at least a third of the Right wing parties voting electorate continue to support the Conservatives. At the same time, the working out of the electoral system in the next general election will be uncertain, and made more so as the voting regulations change and if they do more so than currently outlined. The Conservatives, Reform and Restore in part appeal to different types of voter but there is also the “anyone bar the Left” approach that might lead to implicit or explicit preference co-operation. The number of councils without any overall majority provides a signal here. Compared to America, there is also a different “welfarist” dimension to the electorate while the coherence of the Muslim vote is significant.

Although with a different context and content, that might also suggest that the Goidels have underplayed the role of religious factors. Trump has made a successful attempt to align with them, but the trends on the religious Right do not begin with him.

And yet, contingencies come to the fore. The processes of one President are not necessarily those of another. The “time for a change” politics suggests that the political coalitions that help ensure the takeover of a party can be fissiparous. The opposition to elitism discerned by the Goidels can be articulated on the Left as well as the Right. This book offers much food for thought but is not more than some very good and thoughtful observations on what may only be a relatively short-term phenomenon.