From triple lock to price caps

The triple lock stands out as one of the most successful policies of the Conservative-led governments of the 2010s. In narrow terms, it achieved its objective: pensioner poverty fell, and the state pension became more generous relative to earnings. Even more importantly, it is incredible the degree to which it has dug itself in. No major party can now credibly propose scrapping it outright, and even modest adjustments provoke significant backlash.

As this policy is so totemic, it raises a broader question: what does this mean for how the public thinks about government intervention and guarantees, particularly around incomes and costs? And how far does it encourage the spread of similar policies that politicians will think are politically effective, but not necessarily economically so?

Against that backdrop, it is striking how readily politicians reach for similar tools in other areas. Recent proposals to cap private rents, for example, extend the same logic: if a cost is politically salient, the temptation is to break the glass labelled “fix it by fiat”. Politics becomes less about increasing prosperity and more about putting off the bad stuff as much as possible; a political insulation blanket

We thought we’d have a bit of fun to explore how people feel about this: Opinium conducted polling amongst just over 2,000 UK adults on what sort of similar controls to the triple lock they would like to see implemented. The answer is clear. The public consistently prioritises caps on major household outgoings: energy bills, council tax, and food prices emerge as the most popular options. Counterintuitively, given that the triple lock is primarily an income floor, this reveals a strong preference not for higher incomes but for the government to impose lower or more predictable costs. The instinct is simple: if living standards are under pressure, freeze the pressure rather than relieve it.

In real terms, living standards are shaped by both sides of the equation: what people earn and what they spend. But the public focus is increasingly lop-sided. The instinct is not to earn more, but to pay less; to demand that the state hold prices down rather than push wages up. In effect, voters are asking government to manage the symptoms rather than cure it.

What is most remarkable, however, is where these preferences are directed. In two of the three most popular areas to cap – energy bills and council tax – some form of controls already exist. Energy prices are regulated through a price cap mechanism, while council tax increases are limited annually, with higher rises requiring a referendum. These are not exactly the Wild West of markets. Yet the public demands further intervention in areas already subject to it. Clearly, the appetite for control does not diminish once controls are introduced; it simply grows. Intervention breeds disappointment, not satisfaction.

The only exception in the shortlist is food prices, where no formal cap exists. Even here, the political instinct runs ahead of the economic reality. Supermarkets operate on relatively thin margins in a highly competitive market, and there are not vast profits waiting to be squeezed. The idea that prices can simply be held down without consequence is, at best, optimistic and, at worst, a refusal to engage with reality; a preference for comforting fictions over inconvenient trade-offs.

Also notable is that income-based policies were included in the mix, for example on wages. Even when presented with that wider set of options, the emphasis remains overwhelmingly on controlling costs. Wage increases, while supported by a minority, attract significantly less enthusiasm. The preference is not for becoming better off, but for being shielded from change. If they could, they would wrap the economy in aspic.

This is not just a policy preference; it is a mindset. For much of the period since the 2008 financial crisis, the UK experienced weak wage growth alongside low inflation. Living standards stagnated, but stable prices masked the extent of the problem. Households adapted to an economy that was, at best, steady but unspectacular. For years, the polling said that most people felt comfortably off.

The cost-of-living crisis shattered that fragile equilibrium. When inflation surged, people felt sharply worse off. This is not because incomes collapsed, but because costs rose quickly and visibly. In the public mind, the problem is rising prices, and so the solution is to stop them rising. That instinct is now dominant. Strong governments may still talk about their plans for growth, but weaker ones are pulled relentlessly towards short-term cost control, as we are currently seeing.

Support for cost caps cuts across party lines, with Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and Reform voters expressing broadly similar preferences

What is striking is how little disagreement there is about this. Support for cost caps cuts across party lines, with Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and Reform voters expressing broadly similar preferences. In a fragmented political landscape, that level of agreement is unusual. It points to a shared, and increasingly entrenched, view of how the economy should be managed, one that leaves little room for harder truths.

The only notable variation in the numbers is among Green voters, who are somewhat less focused on energy bills and council tax, and more inclined towards rent controls or tuition fee limits. But even here, the underlying pattern holds: the emphasis remains on constraining costs rather than boosting incomes.

In political terms, this creates a powerful incentive structure. Policies that cap prices or guarantee outcomes are easy to communicate and quick to deliver. For governments under pressure, they offer a lever to pull: visible, immediate, and superficially effective.

The problem is that they do little to address the underlying problems. The pressures pushing costs upwards do not disappear simply because prices are capped. It’s treating a chronic condition like a surface wound.

More importantly, price controls don’t actually work politically either. This is where the government should note the difference in electoral impact between the triple lock on pensioner incomes and the price caps already in place. As the demand for further caps in already regulated areas shows, intervention does not resolve dissatisfaction; it resets expectations. People do not feel the counterfactual improvement to their finances, but simply demand more. The fact there is political pressure for price caps often means the horse has bolted. The prices are already high, and each new cap becomes the baseline for the next demand. A policy designed to reassure instead entrenches a sense that things are always getting worse.

The public will continue to call for price controls. But indulging that instinct is not the same as solving the problem. Governments still face the same underlying challenge: making people materially better off. That ultimately depends on growth. Until that is delivered, no amount of caps, freezes, or guarantees will convince people that they are.