The beginning of the end of the end of history

The past endlessly changes as it is rethought in the present and its relevance in the creation of the latter is rethought. And so, as this excellent volume shows, very much with the 1990s. That decade initially had meaning in terms of that after the Cold War and was seen as consequences and working through: the 1990s were sequence and conclusion, the two interacting. That helped provide a narrative and analysis in which the ending and result of the Cold War led seamlessly into an account of the 1990s as a decade dominated by an American-led political, military, economic and ideological order.

So much, so easy, or, looked at more accurately, so convenient, for the events and developments of the 1990s were in practice very complex and yet required an easy explanation and a contextualisation in post-Cold-War-terms. Result-of-the-Cold-War apparently provided the most apt contextualisation.

This analysis was already under strain in the 2000s. Stresses in the “New World Order” appeared obvious from the mid-2000s as initially-successful interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq ran into serious difficulties. Far more serious were the growing signs that both China and Russia were moving away from their alignments with America and, in addition, looking to each other for support and therefore cooperating.

Thus, the post-Cold-War international order was separating out into stages. This opened up questions about the links between these stages, the relevant explanatory model, and prospectus for the future. Clearly it would be a future of fresh stages and not one that was undifferentiated. Indeed, the Cold War only appeared to be the latter in a misleading hindsight.

By the 2020s and, even more, the mid-2020s, what had appeared incipient, developing, even menacing in the 2000s was now apparently fully-formed. This raised questions about the 2020s, not least because each period has its own senescence and decline or, at least, to use a different imagery, factors conducive to dissolution.

More particularly, a look-back-on-the 1990s was considered, as in this volume, with choices, pathways, missed opportunities, revisiting, reconsidering and each twice more, all on offer in the titles. Inevitably, there is a somewhat transient feel to the volume, not least because of the speed of present developments, while (shock-horror-work) research will reveal new events, views, perspectives and insights. Moreover, the very terms used in this volume such as Populism, Financialisation, Hegemony and Globalism are open to consideration. And this is not new. Ayse Zarakol notes with regard to whether the Soviet Union was defeated in the Cold War, that “the debates turns on what we mean by defeat” (p. 323). At the same time, the view that the Soviet Union was not defeated seems perverse, however much it has now become commonplace.

The Liberal Order comes in for some bashing, Charles Kupchan arguing that the challenges that have confronted the liberal international order have their roots in the liberal overreach of the 1990s, which raises the question of causality and also the appropriate nature of alternative choices. “The ‘Idealist’ displacement of ‘Realist’ Sobriety” is presented by Kupchan as a key element (p. 298).

Less happily, Kupchan is one of those who argues that the eastward advance of NATO was a key factor in the rise of Putinism. This is to confuse rhetoric for reality, with the self-interested arguments of Putin and his supporters used to underplay their own agency while, simultaneously, neglecting the democratic character of NATO’s expansion, as well as its great value for security.

In a brilliant analysis on the New Politics of Globalism, Harold James looks at the reasons why globalisation in economics and morality led to an underrating of pertinent alternative developments including an eventual radicalised backlash. Roads not taken also interest other contributors, such as Jennifer Welsh. Miles Kahler sees China as not even engaging with the would-be political norms of Globalisation.

The profit of the 1990s, not least, but not only, the benefits (and losses) from the economic growth and borrowing of those years, was very unequally distributed. This reflected the decade’s politics but also pre-existing resource bases, structures and practices, as well as the ability to respond to the opportunities and challenges of the period.

A fascinating volume, though it would have been appropriate to move in science and culture. Paths not taken included a major advance in inexpensive nuclear energy. Climate change does not appear to interest the contributors. But a very valuable collection that deserves attention.